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Recent Developments
Maryland v. Wilson

W

eighing public interest
against personal liberty
interests, the risk to officer safety
outweighs the minimal intrusion of
asking a passenger of a lawfully
stopped vehicle to step outside of
that vehicle. This was the holding
in the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Maryland
v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees freedom from "unreasonable"
seizures. In Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court
held that an officer may stop and
frisk a person for weapons, as long
as that officer could articulate
some reasonable suspicion of
possible danger. In Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977),
the Court determined that asking a
driver of a lawfully stopped
vehicle to exit that vehicle, even
with no articulable suspicion of
danger, was not an unreasonable
seizure. In Wilson, the Court was
asked to consider whether extending Mimms to include the passenger of a lawfully stopped
vehicle constituted an unreasonable seizure.
In June 1994, a Maryland State
Trooper stopped a vehicle with
two passengers whose behavior
was unusually nervous and furtive.
Although the driver exited the
vehicle and approached the trooper
without being asked to do so, the
trooper also asked the passenger in
the front seat of the vehicle, Jerry
Lee Wilson ("Wilson"), to exit.
As he was exiting the vehicle,
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Wilson dropped what the trooper
suspected was crack cocaine.
Wilson was arrested and charged
with possession of a controlled
dangerous substance with the
intent to distribute.
At trial, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore
County
granted
Wilson's motion to suppress the
cocaine as the fruit of an unreasonable seizure, violative of his
Fourth Amendment rights. The
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed, adding that
Mimms would not be extended to
apply to passengers. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland denied
certiorari.
Wilson's victory, however,
was short-lived. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the
Court found persuasive the officer
safety arguments of the government, reversed the decision of the
court of special appeals, and
remanded the case for retrial.
In a four-page opinion, the
Court adopted as precedent what it
had previously hinted at in dicta.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885 (citing
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128

(1978)). The Fourth Amendment
guarantee against unreasonable
seizure does not apply to passengers of vehicles once a proper stop
has been made. Wilson, 117 S. Ct.
at 885. The Court applied its longstanding analysis of the reasonableness of a seizure by balancing public interest against an
individual's right to freedom from
arbitrary interference by the
government. Id. In the case of a
lawful traffic stop, officer safety is
given great deference. Id. The
risk to officer safety is increased
when there are passengers in
addition to a driver in a stopped
vehicle. Likewise, any violent
reaction from a driver of a stopped
vehicle, aimed at preventing the
discovery of evidence of some
other crime, is similarly motivated
from a passenger of that vehicle.
Id. By ordering passengers to exit
a vehicle, law enforcement officers
deny the passengers access to
concealed weapons. Id. The risk
inherent in vehicle stops, therefore,
outweighs the minimal intrusion of
asking a passenger in a vehicle that
is already stopped to move to the
outside of that vehicle. Id.
Dissenting from the majority,
Justices Stevens and Kennedy
expressed concern that Wilson
gives the government carte blanche
authority. Officers are now empowered to command drivers and
passengers from their vehicles
without "even a scintilla of
evidence of any potential risk to
the police officer." Id. at 887.
Thus, according to the dissent,
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dispensing with the element of
probable cause, or even some
objective standard, is too heavy an
imposition on the innocent citizens
involved in the large number of
routine stops that occur each day.
Id.
The number of stops where an
officer is ever at risk is, in fact, far
overshadowed by the actual number of routine stops. Id. at 888.
While the imposition on passengers ordered to exit their
vehicles may be insignificant, the
aggregate effect of passengers who

are unnecessarily offended, embarrassed, and exposed to inclement
weather is great. Id.
While the hypotheticals posed
by both the majority and dissent
are compelling, it might be argued
that the Court seized the opportunity, via Wilson, to tip the scales
in favor of public interest. The
Court seemed to disregard the fact
that the trooper who asked Wilson
to exit the vehicle did articulate an
objective suspicion for making that
request. Instead, the Court chose
to rely on policy in rendering its

decision. In effect, the Court
determined that police officers
may be relied upon to use their
knowledge, experience, and training to protect themselves and the
general public.
Editor's Note: Professor Byron L.
Warnken argued the respondent's
case before the United States
Supreme Court against United
States Attorney General Janet
Reno and Maryland Attorney
General J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
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